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FOREWORD
Every year, the Department of Social Sciences at
the United States Military Academy runs a Senior
Conference on behalf of the superintendent. This
event allows distinguished representatives from
the private sector, government, academia, the think
tank community, and the military services to discuss
important national security topics.
Senior Conference 2019, the 55th iteration of this
event, explored the emerging security environment
in the Indo-Pacific region. For three days, experts
with diverse perspectives and experiences considered
the shifting economic realities, political dynamics,
technological trends, and future forms of conflict
and competition that will shape the region’s future.
Though many questions related to the future of the
Indo-Pacific region remain unsettled, the United States
will, undoubtedly, have an important role to play—
and the world will be watching.
One goal of this conference was to inform the
regional assessments of US Army Pacific. We are
grateful to General Robert Brown, the commander of
US Army Pacific, and to key members of his staff for
their participation and collaboration. Colonel Tania
Chacho, Major Zachary Griffiths, and Major Tom
Fox expertly coordinated Senior Conference 55, and
they deserve our thanks for the success of the event.
Rapporteur Dr. Terry Babcock-Lumish directed a
team of faculty notetakers, including Major Sarah
Gerstein, Major Kerney Perlik, Lieutenant Colonel
Cole Spitzack, Major Meghan Starr, Major Stephen
Taylor, and Captain Kyle Wolfley, whose efforts were
essential to the completion of this report. Finally, and
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most importantly, we thank the keynote speakers,
panelists, and participants for their substantive and
lively dialogue throughout the event.
The conference consisted of four in-depth,
topic-specific panels and four keynote sessions. All
presentations and subsequent discussions occurred
on a not-for-attribution basis to allow for free testing
and expression of ideas. For this reason, this report
is motivated by ideas offered during the event, but it
does not attribute these ideas to specific individuals
or organizations. Also, it should be noted that the
opinions documented in these pages reflect the
sentiments expressed by participants and should not
be assumed to represent the position of the United
States Military Academy, the United States Army, or
any other government agency. We hope those who
study, formulate, or execute US policy in the IndoPacific region will benefit from reading this report.

SUZANNE C. NIELSEN, PhD
Colonel, US Army
Professor and Head
Department of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy
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SUMMARY
Senior Conference 55, entitled “The Emerging
Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region: Drivers,
Directions, and Decisions,” explored the evolving
security environment in a critical and dynamic region.
For three days, a diverse group of distinguished
experts considered the shifting economic realities,
political dynamics, and technological trends, as well
as the forms of conflict and competition that will shape
the region’s future. Although uncertainties abound,
understanding the Indo-Pacific’s dynamics is critical
for future political, economic, and security decisions
both within and far beyond the region. While decisionmakers neglect other parts of the world at their
own peril, the greatest challenges of this century will
be faced in and by the Indo-Pacific region.
Rather than narrowly focusing the conference on
the bilateral US-China relationship, the organizers of
Senior Conference 55 deliberately assembled experts
taking a broad approach to the entire Indo-Pacific
region, focusing on the region as a whole to explore
the wider relationships and consequences. Nonetheless, we anticipated a sizable portion of the proceedings would consider the implications of Chinese
decisions and actions, as evidenced by China’s influence in the region and throughout the world.
All West Point Senior Conferences abide by a strict
policy of nonattribution, akin to the norms established by the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(Chatham House) and the Council on Foreign Relations.1 These guidelines ensure participants can speak
openly without concern that statements might later
1. “Chatham House Rule,” Chatham House, accessed August
15, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule.
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be attributed to them in media. Consequently, we not
only asked participants to honor this commitment at
Senior Conference 55, but also take care in this publication to avoid assigning provenance. This report
distills many views into one document, but we as
editors attempted to leave our own views out of it as
much as possible. Where our own assessments enter,
we use the first person to make that clear. Otherwise, the text reflects the discussion and viewpoints
expressed therein.
Several key themes emerged throughout the 2019
proceedings:
First, the United States government (USG) must
develop a clear view and comprehensive understanding of an evolving Indo-Pacific. In 2018, the
US Department of Defense (DoD) renamed its oldest
and largest military command from Pacific Command
(PACOM) to Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM),
signaling the importance of engaging a wider region
to support regional stability throughout the Indian
and Pacific Ocean basins. This decision comes amidst
heightened tensions with China in a hypercompetitive, multi-domain environment and speaks to the
value the USG places on engaging a wider constellation of regional actors. Another helpful reframing
is for the United States to understand better the contemporary rise of China not as an emergence, but
as a reemergence in accordance with its ancient and
dynastic history.
Second, there is an ongoing battle for the narrative of the region. A second theme was whether
and how the United States is shaping a coherent
and consistent counternarrative to China’s ambitious international One Belt, One Road (OBOR)
development initiative.
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One Belt, One Road (OBOR) versus Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI)
Initially developed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
in 2013 as an ambitious, trillion-dollar global development initiative spanning Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, OBOR
refers to an extensive series of infrastructure investments, including both land and sea routes, as well as telecommunications access
and other projects.2 One Belt, One Road’s completion date is slated
for 2049, in conjunction with the PRC’s centenary. In 2016, the Chinese government invested considerably in an English language
campaign rebranding the project as the Belt and Road Initiative
because Beijing considered the “one” emphasis of OBOR to have
problematic diplomatic consequences.3 Within China, the government still primarily uses the OBOR term (一带一路 yidaiyilu) in
materials for a domestic audience. Another lesser-used term used
is the “New Silk Road.” In this report, we made an editorial decision to refer to OBOR rather than BRI.
Some now worry that China’s large-scale investments come
at the expense of international norms and institutions and that
a growing web of international projects and loans are poised to
exacerbate, rather than relieve, complex geopolitical problems.
While certain China watchers express concern about the increasing financial and political dependence countries will have on
China, others are sounding alarms that China seeks to refashion a
twenty-first-century global balance of power in direct challenge
to the established liberal international order. Some observers even
see a remarkable amount of early success in these OBOR projects.
A recent Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder described
OBOR as a potential “Trojan horse for China-led regional development, military expansion, and Beijing-controlled institutions.”4
In recent years, countries in the region have sometimes welcomed
the potential for increased Chinese investment and at other times
pushed back against a seemingly aggressive Chinese campaign.

2.
Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s
Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign
Relations, May 21, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder
/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
3.
Angela Stanzel, “China’s Belt and Road—New
Name, Same Doubts?,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2017, https://www.ecfr.eu/article
/commentary_chinas_belt_and_road_new_name_same_doubts.
4. Chatzky and McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road
Initiative.”
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Third, geography is not dead. While there is validity to the argument that today’s digital technologies
facilitate everything from global dialogue to integrated
markets and increasing cyber capabilities, it would be
folly to neglect the continued relevance of physical
and human geography. Location, culture, and identity
still matter. This concept is particularly important in
the most disaster-prone region in the world, already
confronting the effects of climate change. Although
the DoD is increasingly pursuing nonlethal effects,
the United States is also developing new land-based
technologies to bolster deterrence against China. The
region’s geography suggests that land forces would be
secondary to naval and air units; however, land-based
forces remain significant in any potential conflict in
the Indo-Pacific. Finally, in an increasingly diverse
and interconnected world, one must not underestimate marginalized or vulnerable communities who
feel threatened in the face of rapid economic change
and rising nationalism. These groups can include
religious and ethnic minorities—such as the Tibetan,
Rohingya, and Uyghur peoples—as well as those feeling economically, physically, or socially insecure in
the face of demographic or geopolitical shifts and climate change.
Finally, international relationships remain essential. Throughout the Indo-Pacific, leaders are actively
navigating relationships to secure national interests
and make decisions in the face of economic, technological, diplomatic, military, and ecological uncertainties. The world is watching both the United States
and China with considerable interest and concern, as
each nation works to attract regional partners and to
make sense of where and how to cooperate or compete. It would be shortsighted to force countries to

xiv

US Army War College

choose between the United States and China; rather, it
is essential for the United States to secure its interests
through seeking mutually beneficial solutions with
regional partners. As the United States grapples with
the dynamics of a rapidly developing Indo-Pacific
region, longstanding partners and allies are looking to
American leadership to ensure a secure and prosperous future and to prevent unnecessary escalation of
tensions. Thus, tending to international relationships
and practicing the art of diplomacy remains imperative. While questions abound in the twenty-first
century, there is widespread agreement that one of
America’s greatest assets is its enduring commitment
to an inclusive and universal concept of freedom as
advanced throughout the twentieth century.
We explore areas for future consideration in
greater detail herein but, in brief, we offer five recommendations that emerged from the discussion:
1. The United States cannot go it alone. Strong
international alliances and effective partnerships are essential. The United States cannot
take these for granted. Over past decades,
America has cultivated longstanding international relationships, which take time and effort
to maintain. The United States must continue
to “show up and turn up.” There is no way to
surge trust.
2. Walk the walk on being free and open.5 America
must live up to its values and be the country the
world expects it to be. The United States must
align its actions with its words.
5. US Department of Defense (DoD), Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region
(Washington, DC: DoD, 2019).
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3. Continue to pursue both joint and multi-domain approaches. A key strength of America’s
military is its ability to conduct joint operations better than any other military; developing effectiveness in multi-domain operations is
now necessary.
4. The United States must engage in the global
economy as a reliable investment and trading
partner. The United States cannot rely on military power alone. To counter China’s ambitious
use of economic statecraft, the United States
must continue to build greater capacity for
financial investment and economic engagement.
5. Invest accordingly. If the United States is serious about developing and working toward a
peaceful long-term vision for the Indo-Pacific,
federal budgets and programs must reflect
these priorities.
Even the leading Indo-Pacific thinkers and practitioners acknowledge the difficulty of predicting the
region’s future with great accuracy. However, the
region is—and will continue to be—crucial for both
the United States and the broader global community.
Today, China is America’s primary challenger, with
many other countries also influencing an evolving
regional foreign policy. As the United States navigates
the coming decades beyond narrow political, business, and media cycles, it needs to increase its capacity
for decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
Convenings such as these, which create the conditions for open, honest dialogue, are increasingly
important. Spaces where decisionmakers challenge
assumptions and resist disciplinary or departmental
silos are constructive. Senior Conference 55 offered
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just this opportunity, but it was simply a start. Working effectively across political boundaries and partisan
tensions, as well as across countries, cultures, sectors,
and time zones, is mission-critical to getting both
domestic and foreign policies concerning the IndoPacific right. As the United States confronts challenges throughout the region, we cannot overstate the
value of forging strong relationships and continuing
candid conversations.
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SENIOR CONFERENCE 55—THE EMERGING
ENVIRONMENT IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION:
DRIVERS, DIRECTIONS, AND DECISIONS
THE INDO-PACIFIC LANDSCAPE:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Opening keynote address on Sunday, April 7, 2019:
Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman, former US Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Lunchtime keynote discussion on Monday,
April 8, 2019:
Ambassador Gillian Bird, Australian Ambassador to
the United Nations in conversation with Ambassador
Doug Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO
Evening keynote address on Monday, April 8, 2019:
General Robert B. Brown, US Army Pacific,
Commander
Breakfast keynote address on Tuesday, April 9, 2019:
The Honorable Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister
of Australia
*****

With more than 200 years of combined professional experience, the experts contributing to Senior
Conference 55’s keynote sessions offered invaluable
insights. Given the five speakers’ ranges of subject
matter expertise and geographic reach, the sessions
allowed the assembled audience to widen the aperture
of the Indo-Pacific discussion to consider opportunities and challenges throughout the region and across
the globe. In keeping with Senior Conference 55’s nonattribution policy, all keynote remarks, in addition to

1

each session’s concomitant question-and-answer session, are combined to illuminate overarching strategic
considerations.
Throughout the three days, these distinguished
speakers offered their insights about this dynamic
area of the world, informed by experiences in the military, diplomacy, civil society, and academia. Without
prior coordination, they highlighted many of the same
themes, expressed similar concerns, and arrived at
remarkably comparable conclusions and recommendations. While there was disagreement about specific
Indo-Pacific policies and plans, the keynote speakers
generally agreed on two major points: (1) the future of
the Indo-Pacific region is uncertain, but it will have an
outsized impact on America’s future and may define
America’s role in world affairs; and (2) the United
States must remain economically, diplomatically, and
militarily engaged with its partners and allies, reinforcing a rules-based international order in the face of
mounting Chinese assertiveness.
Watching, Respecting, and Understanding
the Region
Nobody doubts the dynamism of the IndoPacific. Covering the Indian and Pacific Ocean basins,
this wider region contains 36 countries, 16 time zones,
more than half of the world’s megacities, 7 of the 8 fastest-growing markets, 7 of the 10 largest armies, 25,000
islands, and 60 percent of the world’s population—
and it is still growing.1 The two most populous countries, China and India, have pulled a combined total
of nearly one billion people out of extreme poverty.
1. Sean Kimmons, “Land Forces Key to Free, Open IndoAsia Pacific,” Army News Service, May 22, 2019, https://www.army
.mil/article/222191/land_forces_key_to_free_open_indo_pacific.
2

At the same time, life expectancy, patents, and gross
domestic product per capita are on the rise. In keeping with the last 30 years of extraordinary growth,
economists predict that by 2030, the Indo-Pacific will
be home to the five largest national economies: the
United States, China, India, Indonesia, and Japan.
Nonetheless, such vitality comes with considerable
challenges, including increased carbon dioxide emissions, rising inequality, and growing competition for
technology, investors, and territory. Five of America’s
mutual defense treaties are in the region, and most
of the threats discussed in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy come from this area. Climate change, population growth, and urbanization contribute to both the
number and severity of natural disasters that hit the
Indo-Pacific region particularly hard. Earthquakes,
tsunamis, floods, droughts, and other climate-related
extremes are of particular concern for the many countries facing rising sea levels. In addition to potential
loss of lives and livelihoods, extreme weather or geological events displace families from their homes and
disrupt essential food production and markets. Consequently, there is need for cooperation between countries to respond more effectively to extreme weather
events and other exogenous shocks.
Several countries are emerging as crucial actors
in the region—for example, by 2030, India will, globally, have the largest population overall, largest old
population, largest young population, largest group
of wealthy people, and regionally, the largest group
of poor people. Currently, the economy is faring well,
but with 22 different languages and the vestiges of a
caste system, many believe a strongman is necessary
for India’s inchoate democracy. Lastly, as recent difficulties in Kashmir indicate, India and Pakistan’s
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coexistence is perpetually just one mistake or misunderstanding away from a nuclear crisis.
Even though Japan is beset by an aging and shrinking population, it remains an economic and military
force. An aging population likewise besets South
Korea, yet its economy continues to thrive. North
Korea remains one of the world’s most repressive
states and looms as a nuclear threat with a mercurial young leader insisting on fearful obedience from
approximately 25 million North Koreans. Experts
focused on civil and human rights note recent rigged
elections in Cambodia, the jailing of reporters in Myanmar, President Rodrigo Duterte’s crackdown in the
Philippines, and widespread persecution of religious
minorities, particularly Rohingya and Uyghur Muslim
minorities. Despite recent elections in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Afghanistan, whether authoritarian
governments will win out in the Indo-Pacific remains
a large and consequential question.
Much of the discussion throughout the three days
revolved around China as the most formidable competitor to the United States on the world stage not
only economically, politically, technologically, and
militarily, but also in terms of worldview and ultimate influence. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary and People’s Republic of China (PRC)
President Xi Jinping’s priorities are maintaining the
following:
• CCP political control today and into the future;
• national unity, which includes resolving territorial disputes;
• economic performance, which now necessitates environmental considerations for sustainability; and
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• benign and compliant relationships with 14
neighboring countries and China’s maritime
periphery.
China benefits from a remarkable degree of continuity in grand strategy, and its strengths are mirror
images of its weaknesses. Quite simply, China amasses
national power by growing its economy, including
domestic stimulus and extending the reach of OBOR
far beyond its borders. The CCP harbors a deep belief
that its own domestic political legitimacy stems from
strong and positive economic growth. Consequently,
Xi’s stability and security remain inextricably linked
to the stability and strength of the Chinese economy,
including the internal “magic number” of 6 percent
growth. China possesses a formidable security apparatus, in terms of both technological capabilities and
sheer number of personnel. Drawing on a population
of nearly 1.4 billion—more than four times the population of the United States—China maintains over 2.3
million active-duty People’s Liberation Army personnel. Upon identifying technological innovation as a
key strategic weakness in 2015, China swiftly ramped
up its modernization efforts.
These Chinese strengths exist alongside weaknesses. Many view Xi as the strongest Chinese political leader since Deng Xiaoping, perhaps even Mao
Zedong. This perception of power comes at a price,
however, with strong internal critiques emerging over
his potential overreach on term limits, crackdown on
political and academic dissent, overextension in the
South China Sea, and heavy-handed use of technology for surveillance and censorship. Another threat
to Chinese power includes slowing economic growth
and its emerging structural economic deficit. Major
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challenges to Chinese military strength include its
untested capability in battle, the quality of training,
personnel, and its ability to conduct joint operations.
Further, China’s military remains hampered by its
responsibility for domestic security and stability. With
an aging population and an underfunded social security and healthcare system, China also has a structural
budget problem on its hands.
Finally, while China presents a grand strategy, it
suffers from a notable “values vacuum.” Freedom—
be it academic, economic, spiritual, or otherwise—is
attractive. Students of history recall that the effectiveness of the Truman-Kennan Cold War strategy was not
merely based on containment, but critically emphasized a values-based approach. But freedom offers a
powerful narrative that requires two twists for twenty-first-century global engagement. First, freedom is
not uniquely Western; it works in non-Western countries and cultures as well. Consequently, the United
States must stop advocating for freedom as a superior
American or Western notion. Rather, the United States
can find strength in returning to the more inclusive
nature of Eleanor Roosevelt’s Universal Human Rights
Declaration of 1948. Second, increasing economic
inequality in the West presents a legitimate basis for
external critiques of its “freedom project.” So long as
inequality persists and grows, the situation provides a
basis for the Chinese critique that people do not earn a
fair return for engaging in a Western capitalist market
system. As Western societies and economies struggle
to cope with the injustices of their own systems and
difficulties of their own social contracts, they exacerbate both domestic and global anxieties.
Change can be difficult, and people across the
globe feel anxious as societies navigate new challenges
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in an increasingly complex and interconnected era. At
the start of the century, people enjoyed the benefits of
globalization, but many today fear losing their livelihoods and identities. The fear of becoming disempowered or unmoored shows up around the world,
as evidenced by events such as Brexit in the United
Kingdom and the rise of populist and nationalist
parties throughout Europe, the Americas, and Asia.
Concerned workers and voters are afraid of being left
behind as the world grows more diverse and as global
integration favors elites.
In previous eras, such as the Industrial Revolution, the world experienced nativism and bigotry from
people feeling economically or socially insecure. It is
important to understand stability and security stem
not only from freedom from fear, persecution, and
attack, but also from the security of jobs, ways of life,
and familiarity with communities and culture. Human
beings derive value from having a sense of purpose
and belonging. In its current form, globalization challenges these needs and no government is fully prepared. Consequently, the United States and other
countries must actively think through the systems
required to help those who are vulnerable in the face
of change.
Revitalizing the International Liberal Order
While American pundits regularly speak about the
rise of China, it is worth reframing the discussion to
recognize the longer arc of history. Given an ancient
civilization that tracks time by dynasties and thousands, rather than mere hundreds, of years, it makes
sense to recast the global rise of Asia not as an emergence, but as a reemergence. Chinese grand strategy
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is rooted in persistently pushing its perimeter east
through diplomatic, economic, and various other
means. In part, China aims to decouple the United
States from its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
region to realize this broader strategic goal. China is
also actively investing and engaging in the developing world to change the nature, content, and culture
of global governance to align better with Chinese
interests and values.
Strategic thinkers in China tend to see the United
States as lacking a coherent or a consistent grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Having watched
Soviet containment carefully, Chinese senior leaders
take historical lessons from the implosion of the Soviet
Union. China’s view is that American presidents come
and go, and their momentary periods of power make
it difficult to implement a consistent grand strategy.
Consequently, Chinese officials see today as a period
of great opportunity.
China’s ambitious OBOR initiative is the largest
infrastructure project in history and provides a vivid
illustration of the PRC’s intent to lead economically,
militarily, and technologically. China is racing to take
the lead in the future of technology with 5G and artificial intelligence. In doing so, China benefits from theft
of both trade secrets and intellectual property, and
many now view it as the “Saudi Arabia of data” for its
ability to collect data on citizens.2 Instead of serving
as vehicles for connection and communication, social
media and the internet are now crucial tools in an
authoritarian toolbox, offering effective means of state
control. Meanwhile, China’s military modernization
and reforms, its aggression in the South China Sea,
2. Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the
New World Order (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018),
55–56.
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and its shift from land to sea power pose a threat to
Taiwan, Japan, and other American allies in the region.
An American vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that leads to a secure and prosperous region is
predicated on security in terms of values, political
systems, open seas and airways, free trade, and transparent investment. Today, the United States argues
against China’s initial OBOR strategy as inconsistent with promises of freedom and openness. That
is, many roads and opportunities for engagement are
essential—not just one.
The changing character of warfare hints at future
hypercompetition across cyber, commerce, and space
domains, in addition to traditional land, air, and sea
contests. Any area the United States leaves or ignores,
even temporarily, can expect a rapid influx of money
and influence from China and Russia. At present, the
United States views both countries as competitors, but
it sees China wielding a longer-term vision and more
concerted approach to multi-domain competition.
Accordingly, the USG, specifically the Department of
Defense and INDOPACOM, are readying an expansion of multi-domain capabilities. The US military
operates on the assumption that it must constantly
work to shape the security environment to prevent
conflict; however, it must also be ready to fight and
win, should the need arise.
China is also increasingly confident. While the Chinese were once reluctant to display their technology
or military, now they are bolder in displaying capabilities they have that others do not. The Chinese military
seems to be growing more risk acceptant, as evidenced
by the People’s Liberation Army’s increased efforts at
power projection. In recent years, China constructed
nine new islands in the South China Sea and built its
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first overseas base in Africa. The United States does
not equate confidence or competition with conflict, but
it is worried by the PRC’s increased aggressiveness.
China’s mounting ambitions and reach necessitate not only a better understanding of its activities
but also a more robust response from the international community. Considering history, the world
in 1918 provides important lessons more than a century later. In a complex strategic global environment,
President Woodrow Wilson tried to lead a new global
order committed to global governance and action,
but he did not have domestic support for his vision.
American isolationism adversely affected the interwar
period, and it was not until the wake of World War II
that the United States reflected on the lessons learned,
ultimately committing to a strategy of engagement to
avoid repeating strategic errors.
Today, many are, again, looking to the United
States to maintain its leadership role in the international community, but they are concerned—for example, the United States and Australia enjoy a strong
alliance built over the last century and have fought
alongside one another through every conflict. This
type of partnership takes time and commitment to
build. Accordingly, at a time when one cannot deny
the size and influence of the Chinese military over the
Indo-Pacific region, friends, allies, and adversaries
alike are calculating American “staying power” for the
long run. One cannot surge trust.
In contrast to the prediction of many experts, economic liberalism has not led to political liberalism in
Asia. In fact, today’s authoritarian governments are
faring as well as democracies economically, if not
better. Further, the global community is increasingly
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concerned about sustained American commitment to
international agreements, institutions, and norms.
Interestingly, the Pew Research Center finds that,
throughout the world, countries still seek America’s
leadership to support free and open access to information and trade. Despite concerns about American reliability on the world stage, Pew reports countries still
prefer American leadership within the world order, as
illustrated by figures 1 through 3. This preference is
particularly vivid among China’s Indo-Pacific neighbors, such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea,
and Australia.
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Figure 1. Assessing global support for Chinese
leadership
Reprinted by permission from“5 Charts on Global Views of China,”
Pew Research Center, Washington, DC (October 18, 2018), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/19/5-charts-on-global-views
-of-china/ft_18-10-19_chinaviews_chinasincreasingglobal/.

Figure 2. Comparing global views on US and
Chinese power

Reprinted by permission from Richard Wike et al., “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies,”
Pew Research Center, Washington, DC (October 1, 2018), https://
www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/trumps-international
-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/.

12

Figure 3. Comparing global support for US and
Chinese leadership

Reprinted by permission from Richard Wike et al., “Trump’s
International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies,” Pew
Research Center, Washington, DC (October 1, 2018), https://
www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/trumps
-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/.
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Governments throughout the Indo-Pacific and the
world are carefully watching China’s increasing influence in global affairs. So long as China and America
are competing for leadership in a multipolar world,
the United States must respect, better understand, and
consistently engage with other states likewise navigating the challenges of a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex landscape.
US policy in the region remains difficult to decipher. Observers note America’s employment of military and economic approaches are intended to advance
free and open societies in the region, yet questions
abound when US leaders do not show up at international meetings and withdraw from international
agreements. Currently, America’s greatest challenges
are committing to and abiding by its stated values,
articulating a long-term strategy, and ultimately, leading as an Indo-Pacific power. When faced with the rise
of authoritarian powers preceding World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in his 1940 “stabin-the-back” speech that a world in which the United
States was the “lone island” of democratic liberalism
would be a “shabby and dangerous place to live.”3 He
delivered his famous “Four Freedoms” speech only
months later in the 1941 State of the Union. The world
is now watching to see how US leaders respond to the
current moment.

3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address of the President,
University of Virginia” (speech, Graduation Exercise, University
of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, June 10, 1940), http://www
.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msf01330.
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American Exceptionalism
While never mentioned explicitly during the three days of
proceedings, we identified an underlying theme throughout
Senior Conference 55 as the notion of “American exceptionalism.” Invoking Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor John Winthrop’s 1630 sermon introducing the notion of a “city upon a
hill,” President-elect John F. Kennedy referenced the image in
his 1961 farewell speech at the Massachusetts State House. President Ronald Reagan further popularized the idea of the United
States as exceptional within the world order during the height
of the Cold War in the 1980s. These two leaders have not been
alone in invoking this idea. While the concept of the United
States holding a unique place as an international beacon for freedom and other democratic ideals can be debated, it remains a
widely understood—and in many international relationships,
an assumed—expectation. Across American administrations
and across the world, many continue to hope the United States
will serve as a benevolent hegemon whose foreign policy is
informed by universal values and enables states to enjoy mutual
gains. Although, in practice, the post-World War II US foreign
policy record has achieved mixed success in this regard, historically, this expectation has been legitimated by a demonstrable
US commitment to an open international trading system and
democratic institutions.

Many like to think that, historically, domestic politics stopped at the water’s edge. This convention does
not appear to hold today, as evidenced by the politicization of foreign policy issues through hyperpartisan
domestic squabbles—for example, it is only in recent
years that climate change has morphed into a partisan
policy issue instead of a nonpartisan data-driven issue.
Similarly, both the Trans-Pacific Partnership and collaboration with the Association for Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) present logical, evidence-based
opportunities to advance American interests alongside global ones, and yet, recent years have seen the
United States stepping back. Many experts, political
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party notwithstanding, express concerns about American fluctuation in policy and behavior at the very
time when international circumstances call for stability and steadiness. In particular, international markets and relationships do not weather unpredictability
well, and ambitious long-term planning for technological and military needs necessitates many years of
sustained effort.
Democracy is messy, and the American version
is a constantly evolving system. One might argue
that a reasonable individual, when presented with
the choice of political freedom or safety and stability,
might opt for an authoritarian government that provides the latter. Articulated during the proceedings
was the notion that Americans are always trying to
perfect their democracy. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
suggests that, first, people must eat. Security and the
preservation of life will always be fundamental building blocks. But at some point, once basic needs are
secure, people seek to exercise agency. As the Indo-Pacific region has its own past and unique qualities,
democracy in Asia will not be a carbon-copy of American democracy. But people yearn for control over their
lives, which includes basic freedoms and the right to
political participation. Consequently, truly authoritarian governments are at risk in the long term.
When it comes to international engagement and
the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, the United
States seeks to work with others where it can and compete where it must. One concern is the polarized state
of political discourse in the United States, which can
make domestic consensus on issues of foreign policy
difficult to forge. One area affected by this dynamic is
human rights—for example, concern was expressed
that US foreign policy conversations might address
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the maltreatment of Christians, but less so the persecution of Muslims. In times of uncertainty and anxiety, people cling to their identities and fear others. In
brief, America must be what it seeks the world to be,
living up to the stated values of a rules-based order.
This includes not only maximizing economic prosperity and minimizing strategic risk in the region, but also
advocating for rule of law, human rights, and freedom
of navigation and trade.
In addition to direct benefits to the United States,
sustained US engagement in the region is valuable
for the incentives it gives to other actors, including
China. In terms of utility to American policymakers, maintaining a presence allows the United States
to engage swiftly in humanitarian and disaster relief
missions and rapidly deploy forces in support of other
contingencies. Further, continued US involvement
may also make it more likely that China will adhere
to international norms and agreements. When China
does not anticipate consequences for its actions, it is
likely to establish its own system, made in the Chinese image—for instance, China has already entered
areas the United States has neglected, such as remote
areas of Oceania. Consequently, it is important the
United States demonstrates sustained commitment
to the entire region. America must continue to assure
partners and allies of its commitment by consistently
showing up, as actions speak louder than words. Any
lack of involvement may signal doubt in the American commitment to sustained peace and security in
the region.
One area for hope is that military-to-military
relations across regional forces remain close, in part
because an apolitical military has experience separating current political currents from long-established
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relationships. Consequently, experts ardently encourage continued exercises and exchanges. Similarly,
the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership illustrates a fundamental component of security policy for
the Indo-Pacific, with all five countries—the United
States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada—maintaining high levels of sharing and trust
that allow for early detection and countering of threats.
This unique arrangement is unlikely to be replicated
and provides important benefits. In addition to this
intelligence sharing arrangement, the United States
must consider the importance of its alliances more generally. The recent seventieth anniversary of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) showcased both
the strength of the alliance, as well as its continued
relevance in the face of global developments. Chinese
investment in Europe, for example, could pose a possible threat, with Chinese investment in ports in Italy
and Greece giving Beijing a strong vested interest in
the economies of these countries. Although these are
economically-focused investments at present, there is
a growing awareness that the Chinese may use these
to their political advantage to influence the prevailing
international order into the future.
Throughout East Asia, there is continuous hedging
based on perceptions of how military and economic
asymmetries will affect American allies in the Pacific.
Xi views China as a global power, but that does not
necessarily equate to military dominance. In the face
of continuous Chinese concerns about domestic challenges, stability in the region is essential. While China
must have the space to dissent, it is in the interest of
the United States that the PRC do so within the confines of the current rules-based order rather than
attempting to establish a competing order. Further, US
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engagement with longstanding partners and allies discourages Chinese manipulation of the current international order to serve narrowly its interests. While
Xi has the advantage of centralized domestic control,
other countries bring soft power advantages to the
rules-based order. Cyberattacks may be among the
first true tests, with China and Russia on one side, and
much of the western world, including the Five Eyes,
on the other. At the end of the day, the United States
must continue to engage in the Indo-Pacific, playing
not only a substantive role but also aligning its words
and actions.
Ultimately, the United States must be deliberate
in executing a long-term strategy to ensure a free and
open Indo-Pacific region. Essential to this role is the
continued cultivation of allies and partners and sustained investment in international engagement. With
China’s increased aggressiveness and technological
advances, as well as the size and significance of the
region, the United States must make these recommendations a national priority, focusing American
strengths and resources accordingly.

19

PANEL 1: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Panelists
• Dr. Elizabeth Economy, Council on Foreign Relations
• Professor Jennifer Sciubba, Rhodes College
• Mr. David Bohigian, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Executive Vice President
• Dr. Syaru Shirley Lin, University of Virginia
Moderator: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph DaSilva, Army
Talent Management Task Force
Guiding Questions
• What effect will the development of new economic and trading arrangements have on
regional relationships and US interests?
• How might emerging markets and new Arctic
trade routes impact security priorities in Asia?
• How will demographic trends affect the region?
• What are the implications of these economic
changes for US national security interests?
The United States cannot rely on military power
alone. The United States and China are actively
engaged in economic competition throughout the
Indo-Pacific, and the United States risks losing influence if it fails to create economic opportunities with
regional partners.
Retreating from global supply chains and broader
economic engagement is simply not an option in an
increasingly interconnected global marketplace. Private sector firms have enjoyed longstanding working
relationships throughout the region. Yet US policy has
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been slow to realize the opportunities and challenges
of purposeful economic statecraft in the region. This
session yielded broad agreement that one of the most
important—and hitherto underdeveloped—aspects of
American engagement in the Indo-Pacific is the use of
economic power to shape the strategic environment.
Although the Indo-Pacific receives substantial
attention today, the region has long been a major
interest for the United States and will continue to be in
the future. Three main themes emerged in this session
considering America’s international economic engagement: changing demographics, the potential dilemma
between economic prosperity and security, and competition through development economics.
Changing Demographics
The Indo-Pacific is home to over half the world’s
population, including the world’s most populous
countries, China and India. Most countries have aging
populations, with Japan the vanguard of this phenomenon—its median age is currently 46 years—while
other states, including China, suffer from low rates of
fertility and immigration, as illustrated by figures 4
through 6.
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Figure 4. Percentage of the population in the IndoPacific region age 65 and over, 1950–2050
From World Population Prospects 2019, by United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
custom data acquired via website, ©2019 United Nations. Reprinted
with the permission of the United Nations.
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Figure 5. Life expectancy of the population in the
Indo-Pacific region, 1950–2050
From World Population Prospects 2019, by United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
custom data acquired via website, ©2019 United Nations. Reprinted
with the permission of the United Nations.

23

Total Fertility (Children per woman)
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Figure 6. Fertility rates of the population in the
Indo-Pacific region, 1950–2050
From World Population Prospects 2019, by United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
custom data acquired via website, ©2019 United Nations. Reprinted
with the permission of the United Nations.

According to UN projections, the percentage of
those aged 65 and older in China, India, and Indonesia will more than triple between 2000 and 2050, and
more than double in Japan. Whether an aging population will result in more or less international cooperation remains an open question. Theory argues both
sides: an older populace may result in less aggression
and more cooperation, yet aging states may strive to
appear strong as a means of deterring aggressors.4
Thus, the panel cautioned against drawing oversimplified inferences from earlier periods of demographic
transition worldwide or even from previous experience within the region. Further, demographic changes
4. For an overview of the various theories related to
population aging and conflict, see Mark L. Haas, “Population
Aging and International Conflict,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics, July 2017.
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may mean different things for countries at different
levels of development in the region. Therefore, it is not
necessarily accurate to equate the aging of China with
that of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Certainly, the
political challenges of coping with an aging population vary significantly depending on the overall level
of development of these economies.
It may be problematic to compare population patterns in Europe during the first wave of major demographic change to China today. Even comparing
contemporary Taiwan and Singapore—considering
their divergent domestic institutions—may lead to
incorrect conclusions. Outmigration also presents a
striking dynamic in the region, with almost half of all
international migrants originating from the region.
Demographers anticipate internal migration will
reshape landscapes as millions of people move from
rural to urban centers in search of better educational
and economic opportunities. Rapid urbanization
requires proactive planning to make cities places of
economic growth and to create new opportunities for
sustainable development. Tracking and understanding the trajectory of population trends will be key to
guiding America’s and other countries’ domestic and
foreign policymaking in the years to come.
Concerning American demographics, historically,
American birthrates and immigration have tracked
slightly higher than the world average, yielding an
advantage. Now that the United States has crossed
over into a low-birthrate society, it must make a
conscious choice about how to manage population
trends.5 A more welcoming national immigration
5. Brady E. Hamilton et al., “Births: Provisional Data for
2018,” Vital Statistics Rapid Release Report No. 007 (National
Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, May 2019).
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policy stands to bolster future economic development, labor markets, and tax revenues, whereas more
restricted immigration policies will leave the United
States more susceptible to ongoing fertility trends (as
China is now experiencing). Despite bipartisan efforts
toward comprehensive immigration reform across
recent administrations, presently, there is little optimism for agreement.
Balancing Prosperity and Security
China’s impressive economic growth introduces a
major dilemma for countries throughout the region: to
seek economic opportunities with a rising power or to
develop closer security ties with the United States as
counterbalance. Many ambitious young Taiwanese,
for instance, seek employment or investment opportunities in China, yet if they wish to retain liberal
values and desire security guarantees from the United
States, they face a difficult decision. As Chinese trade
and finance increases in Taiwan, China becomes the
“economic partner of choice” while US investment
remains limited.6 The difficult tightrope the Taiwanese must walk is remaining connected with China
economically while remaining free and democratic
in the face of growing Chinese power. Influence from
China is penetrating all levels of society, especially
in advance of a 2020 presidential election in Taiwan.
Must Taiwan choose a pro-China president? And if
it does not, will China economically punish Taiwan,
especially if US-Taiwan relations tighten and Beijing deems Taiwan to be resisting unification at an
unacceptable level?
6. Charles I-hsin Chen, “Why the US May Lose Taiwan to
Beijing Economically,” Diplomat, June 14, 2019, https://thediplomat
.com/2019/06/why-the-us-may-lose-taiwan-to-beijing-economically/.
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What does this mean for other states in the region?
Sri Lanka, for instance, also needs Chinese investment
since no US investment is available; yet, the country
has fallen into high levels of debt with China.7 The
panel observed that the American position has eroded,
while Chinese influence is increasing.
There was noteworthy disagreement about
whether Chinese economic growth and influence
could be sustained. As overseas development projects create debt from low-income states, attracting
investors in the future may become more difficult,
and the Chinese government may struggle to manage
these projects. A counternarrative posits that China
will continue to subsidize its ambitions via stimulus
packages because long-term political and security
objectives will remain paramount. It remains to be
seen whether China is deliberately driving states into
debt as a means of taking control of infrastructure and
other assets through “debt trap diplomacy,” or if economic vulnerability is a natural result as China deals
with countries that are already struggling financially.
While there was disagreement on whether the current
US administration is doing enough to compete with
China, it seems clear that the United States recognizes
the threat, as well as other countries’ interest in having
the United States continue to serve as a counterbalance in the region.
Economic Statecraft: OBOR and OPIC
The primary focus of the panel was on Chinese
and American initiatives that leverage economic
7. Eric Bellman, “Sri Lanka, Deep in Debt, Turns Increasingly
to China for Loans,” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2019, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/sri-lanka-deep-in-debt-turns-increasingly-to
-china-for-loans-11548774001.
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power to achieve national interests: for China, OBOR;
for the United States, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC). While the original goal of OBOR
was to develop external markets for Chinese manufacturing and overcapacity, particularly in poorer
regions through six regional corridors, it has evolved
considerably since inception. Today, China is continually extending the project’s reach to include online
investment opportunities, extensions into the Arctic,
and even outreach to South America. The panel considered the most alarming aspect of OBOR to be its
security implications, such as a naval base in Djibouti,
with speculation that the Chinese military is likely
planning additional bases in the future.8
There also seems to be a domestic political aspect
of OBOR: China is not exporting a Communist model
per se, but it is certainly authoritarian components of
such a model—for instance, the Chinese are actively
training other countries in how to monitor or censor
online content. Recent OBOR successes for recipient
countries include Greece receiving a prosperous new
port and Pakistan enjoying more electricity. Nevertheless, some see China’s use of “debt trap diplomacy”
as self-serving, creating beneficiaries who become
beholden to Chinese interests after failing to pay back
loans. Recipient states appear to be catching on and are
canceling or renegotiating numerous projects. Chinese
companies receive 90 percent of contracts, which often

8. For a further discussion, see Andrew Scobell and Nathan
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “The Flag Lags but Follows: The PLA
and China’s Great Leap Outward,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the
PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, ed. Phillip Saunders et
al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019),
171–99.

28

exclude local workers, and some critics now say some
OBOR projects are manifestations of neocolonialism.9
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation
coordinated with US domestic private industry to provide development finance to lower-income countries
so they could become reliable, self-sufficient partners.
Specifically, OPIC attempted to integrate the tools of
defense, diplomacy, and development to support the
economic pillar of the 2017 National Security Strategy.
Projects within OPIC actively sought to differentiate
themselves from the Chinese-led OBOR via five ways:
1. Respecting state sovereignty,
2. Seeking to protect the environment,
3. Empowering local workers,
4. Upholding transparency, and
5. Creating projects that are “built-to-last.”10
The bipartisan Better Utilization of Investment
Leading to Development (BUILD) Act seeks to leverage better private sector equity for development
by turning OPIC into a more capable development
agency to provide development finance, the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC).
This new development finance institution will help
developing countries prosper while advancing American foreign policy goals and enhancing national
security interests.11
9. Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big
Mistake,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy
.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/.
10. “OPOC, JBIC and DFAT/EFIC Reaffirm Commitment
to Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Development,” Oversees Private
Investment Corporation, June 25, 2019, https://www.opic.gov/press
-releases/2019/opic-jbic-and-dfatefic-reaffirm-commitment-indo-pacific
-infrastructure-development.
11. Daniel F. Runde, “America’s Global Infrastructure
Opportunity: Three Recommendations to the New U.S.
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While some might liken OBOR to the post-World
War II Marshall Plan, it is not an aid program, but
rather an economic development one. In contrast
with the state-directed OBOR, OPIC (and in turn, the
USIDFC, once it comes online) relies on voluntary private sector involvement. Therefore, the US initiatives
must create the conditions conducive to investment
in developing countries. This approach may offer an
advantage for China, as the United States does not
have the ability to order companies to invest. Moreover, several speakers agreed Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a
strategic mistake that cost the United States regional
economic influence. There was greater optimism,
however, about the United States holding superior
technology in areas such as semiconductors. There
remains considerable incentive to continue investing
in sustaining America’s edge in technological innovation, particularly in environmental, biomedical, information, and communication technologies.
Yet to be seen are the specific political outcomes the
Chinese seek through OBOR. Does the PRC see OBOR
as a form of soft power that makes recipient states
agreeable to Chinese influence, or does Beijing seek to
use OBOR to gain control over vital digital or physical
infrastructure? While Xi broadcasts a long-term vision
for China in 2049, the United States has yet to articulate a coherent grand strategy and finds itself hampered by partisan divisiveness and short-termism. The
Development Finance Corporation,” Center for Strategic &
International Studies, April 11, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis /
americas-global-infrastructure-opportunity-three-recommendations new-us-development-finance; and “Who We Are,” Development
Finance Corporation, accessed January 27, 2020, https://
www.dfc .gov/who-we-are.
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world remains interested in how American plans and
actions will develop in the future, and what strategic
vision the United States will offer.
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PANEL 2: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Panelists
• Professor Thomas Christensen, Columbia
University
• Dr. David Finkelstein, Center for Naval Analyses, Director of China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs
• Mr. Scott Norwood, US Army Pacific, Director
• Ms. Lindsey Ford, Asia Society Policy Institute
Moderator: Dr. Al Willner, Center for Naval Analyses,
Research Scientist
Guiding Questions
• What domestic challenges do the rising powers
of the Indo-Pacific currently face?
• How can we better understand the interdependent relationship between military and diplomatic engagement in the region?
• How does regionalization on the Asian continent affect the potential for cooperative and
competing security interests?
• What are US capabilities in the region?
• How are allied and partner perspectives evolving in the region, and what implications does this
have for the United States’ alliance structure?
The US-China security relationship will define the
coming decades. The most dangerous scenario sees a
rising China as a security threat to the international
order because it seeks to drive the United States out
of East Asia, dominate that region, and challenge the
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United States in a new Cold War. Fortunately, these
concerns are overblown. But the good news ends there.
The challenges posed by China’s rise are real and
take two main forms: dissuading China from settling
its many maritime disputes with weaker neighbors
through coercion and military force, thereby destabilizing a region of growing global importance, and
encouraging China to contribute to international stability by using its economic clout to help solve global
problems. The United States must strike a balance
between two divergent strategies to manage this challenge: on the one hand, competing through the maintenance and attraction of regional partners; on the other,
cooperating with China where opportunities exist.
The United States is a Pacific power. While some
might consider the United States an external actor in
the Indo-Pacific, it has maintained a military presence
in Asia for almost two centuries and fought multiple
wars in the region. Despite varying definitions of the
region over time, contemporary challenges call for a
consideration of actors throughout East Asia, South
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, in addition to countries located in the Americas that lie along the coast of
the Pacific Ocean.
This panel grappled with the shape of the emerging security competition, how the United States should
develop a strategy to achieve its goals in the region,
and where opportunities for cooperation might prevent unnecessary escalation of tensions. Three discrete
topics emerged from this session: the management
of competition, the role of allies and partners in the
region, and how technology will shape international
engagement.
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Managing US-China Competition
Panelists offered differing perspectives on the
intensity of the US-China competition and how best to
manage it. One perspective held that the US-led order
has provided immense economic and security benefits
to the region, and today, China is actively challenging
this order as an emerging power “of consequence.”
Because of this, the United States should invest heavily in military and economic tools to balance against
China. Should the United States fail to continue to
make the Indo-Pacific a priority and offer assurances
to allies, these partners, such as Japan, may rearm to
protect themselves.
A counterview to that bold approach called for the
United States to acknowledge the challenges inherent
in China’s growing power and sovereignty claims over
territory such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the
South China Sea, but it also created specific opportunities to cultivate regional cooperation—for instance,
without Chinese assistance, international nuclear proliferation will be harder to manage so long as China
remains a major trading partner with nuclear-seeking states such as North Korea and Iran. This view
assumes China is not dominating the region but rather
trying to deter American involvement in regional sovereignty conflicts. There was wide agreement that the
goal of US policy should be to convince China not to
use force to regain territory it considers sovereign,
while avoiding unnecessary escalation, particularly
with ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities
looming in the background.
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Engaging Regional Partners and Allies
Another major feature of the discussion was the
role of partnerships and alliances in the region. The
United States is increasingly coercing other countries to share a greater burden for security, leading to
concerns that Washington is bullying other countries
instead of respecting them as sovereign states with
their own foreign policies, priorities, and needs. Allies
are watching American moves carefully and may
hedge against mistreatment and relative international
decline by proclaiming neutrality or even drawing
closer to China. If the United States forces countries to
choose sides, it may not like the outcome.
This session considered the provocative question:
“Can a country be a superpower without allies?” Presently, the United States benefits from several partnerships and treaty alliances throughout the region,
while China actively avoids “entangling” alliances.
The PRC and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea do, however, maintain a “Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,” up for renewal
in 2021.12 Participants suggested China is increasingly
acknowledging the value of international engagement as useful for balancing power. At the same time,
Chinese salami-slicing tactics in the South China Sea
make deterrence less effective, and the United States
risks losing influence without strong alliances. China’s
security partnerships are growing and may undermine American influence, with defense sales and
military exercises with the Philippines and Taiwan
offering evidence of this phenomenon.
12. Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,”
Council on Foreign Relations, June 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org
/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.
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There is wide agreement that the United States
must retain allies and partners to sustain the rulesbased international order, particularly when China
is actively trying to drive wedges among established
international partners. Allies both within and beyond
the Indo-Pacific are increasingly concerned about
whether the United States will honor its defense treaty
commitments, and ultimately, whether it has a coherent, consistent, long-term strategy to deal with China
throughout the twenty-first century.
US Defense Agreements throughout the
Indo-Pacific Region
The United States views a healthy network of allies and partners as a force multiplier not only for warfighting capability, but
first and foremost, to proactively deter conflicts and maintain peace.
Current American alliances and treaties in force throughout the
region include the following:
Philippine Treaty (Bilateral)
• Date signed: August 30, 1951
• Parties: Philippines, United States
Agreement between the United States, Australia and New Zealand
• Date signed: September 1, 1951
• Parties: Australia, New Zealand, United States
Republic of Korea Treaty (Bilateral)
• Date signed: October 1, 1953
• Parties: South Korea, United States
Southeast Asia Treaty
• Date signed: September 8, 1954
• Parties: Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines,
Thailand, United Kingdom, United States
Japanese Treaty (Bilateral)
• Date signed: January 19, 1960
• Parties: Japan, United States13

13. US Department of State (DoS), Treaties in Force: A List
of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States
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As much as the conversation often becomes one
about the United States and China, many argue that
getting China right requires getting Asia right. In
basketball parlance, the United States should shoot
for a “bank shot” with a wider focus throughout the
broader region, rather than maintain a single-minded
concentration on China alone. To that end, the United
States seeks to maintain a robust array of global allies
and partners collaborating to safeguard a free and
open international order.
Views diverged with respect to whether the United
States should pursue more competitive or cooperative
strategies to manage Chinese power. Many argue that
American leadership must continue to engage with
allies and partners through military exercises, technical assistance, and trade to prevent them from choosing nonalignment or closer cooperation with China. In
contrast, others express concern that forcing partners
to take sides may actually push them closer to China,
hindering long-term regional stability and cooperation in solving global problems.
Avoiding narrow, zero-sum decisions may be in
everyone’s interest, particularly if countries are better
served by pursuing strategic ambiguity, benefiting
from effective military deterrence while not aggravating China. In this sense, the United States should
want China to succeed in economic projects such as
OBOR, but only in ways that are mutually beneficial
for all involved. Likewise, OPIC will be successful if
it forces China to compete in terms of transparency
and economic development. With greater cooperation,
in Force on January 1, 2019 (Washington, DC: DoS, 2019); and
“U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,” State Department,
accessed January 27, 2020, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/
treaty /collectivedefense/index.htm.
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countries may find paths to resolving sovereignty disputes diplomatically and without greater escalation.
Countering Military Innovation
China has invested greatly in its development of
asymmetric military capabilities to project power,
creating challenges throughout the region. From submarines with cruise missiles, advanced air defenses,
antisatellite weapons, cyberweaponry, and nuclear
modernization, regional allies must reckon with novel
challenges, and are looking for US support. Yet, that
support must move beyond rhetoric and include
action—for example, the United States must seek ways
to support allies and partners who face disputes over
competing territorial claims in the South China Sea in
ways that mitigate the risk of conflict escalation.
The Defense Department is actively working to
catch up, but any large-scale innovation requires considerable resources and time. China’s anti-access/
area-denial (A2/AD) technology, previously underestimated, has greatly improved. Without effective
countermeasures, the United States risks being shut
out and vulnerable to attack within both the first
and second island chains. Consequently, the Defense
Department is developing new land-based technologies to bolster deterrence against China, and the US
military is increasingly interested in how it might
use nonlethal effects, such as cyberwarfare, to shape
future conflicts. Moreover, INDOPACOM’s Multi-Domain Task Force offers a new force structure intended
to overcome the A2/AD threat, and the US Army is
piloting this type of unit through simulations and field
exercises. Though the region’s geography seems to
indicate that land forces would be secondary to naval
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and air units, one panelist emphasized that land-based
forces remain integral in shaping the development of
any potential Indo-Pacific conflict.
Of particular interest was the question of how to
curb military tensions with China. The United States
might consider further use of nontraditional security problems, such as humanitarian disasters and
drug trafficking, as opportunities to collaborate with
the Chinese. Conducting exercises in preparation for
humanitarian disaster response assistance is beneficial for all parties and encourages multilateralism.
Accordingly, the United States may wish to reconsider its decision to disinvite China from future Rim
of the Pacific Exercises. Participating militaries learn a
great deal about the People’s Liberation Army Navy
during maneuvers (although China correspondingly
collects information about US and partner operations).
Another option is to make the US Navy’s Freedom of
Navigation Patrols more regular and routine, and thus
less provocative. In sum, these very questions indicate
that despite the continued challenge of growing Chinese power, constructive measures exist to navigate it
peacefully and should be explored further.
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PANEL 3: THE POTENTIAL OF TECHNOLOGY
Panelists
• Vice Admiral T.J. White, Fleet Cyber Command, Commander
• Mr. Karan Bhatia, Google, Vice President of
Global Public Policy and Government Relations
• Ms. Renee DiResta, New Knowledge, Director
of Research
• Mr. Jonathan Reiber, Illumio, Head of Cybersecurity Strategy
Moderator: Mr. Jason Healey, Columbia University
Guiding Questions
• What challenges and opportunities do emerging technologies offer countries in the Indo-Pacific region?
• How does rapid adaptation of technology
affect social, cultural, and political systems in
the region?
• What are the implications of Indo-Pacific technological adaptation for the United States?
From public-private partnerships that develop
digital technologies to the implications of subversive
information operations and the proliferation of nefarious cyber capabilities, great uncertainty remains about
the course of technological adaptation in the Indo-Pacific and its implications for the United States. While
there is considerable optimism regarding America’s
potential as a global leader leveraging its longstanding
dominance in technological innovation, others forecast
a digital future fraught with increased competition,
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most notably from China. Concerns abound regarding the growth of capabilities from malign state and
nonstate actors alike, threatening privacy and security. With a precipitous decline of barriers to entry
for cyber capabilities, the United States faces a largely
ungoverned and rapidly expanding digital ecosphere.
The United States, along with its partners and
allies, depends on free and open access to information for prosperity and security. But this dependency
is predicated on the ability to establish trust in data
and trust among people, organizations, and countries. Unfortunately, America’s strategic competitors
are interested in leveraging new technologies to erode
this trust, degrading the ideas of liberty and privacy in
favor of social citizen scores and propaganda.
To make matters more challenging, the distinction
between national security technologies that are unique
or exclusive, and those available to the global market,
is diminishing. America’s national security apparatus
is no longer a lone driver of technological development for military applications. Rather, the US military
is one of many consumers within a hypercompetitive
global market, within which everyone’s information
and data can potentially be exposed and exploited.14
Technological Infrastructure
Overall, the Indo-Pacific region is relatively weak
in technological infrastructure with notable exceptions
such as China, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, as
well as major urban centers throughout the region.
14. Dhruva Jaishankar, “From the iPhone to Huawei:
The New Geopolitics of Technology,” Lawfare (blog),
August
1,
2019,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/iphone-huawei
-new-geopolitics-technology?fbclid=IwAR0LWj7lhiklLpPnSw
_uqjXlay5m4FYL_rJuasynP6d7q80fmNymrJJ7Y2w.
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The region’s digital development has progressed at
different paces and in disparate ways but with optimistic forecasts for considerable growth potential
throughout the ASEAN states. Chinese firms are vigorously competing for digital influence with overt
financial and political backing from the CCP.
Huawei’s 5G is now a mature technology, and
China’s centralized control enables it to mobilize as a
competitive force to rival American firms for market
share throughout the world, not just in the Indo-Pacific. Under Xi, China is effectively offering an alternative to the digital world pioneered in Silicon Valley.
Instead of one free and open global internet, ostensibly governed by liberal democratic norms, there is a
real possibility that the future may produce multiple
internets, many controlled by authoritarian regimes.15
In addition to the physical islands it constructed
in the South China Sea, China is on pace to build
what could amount to an “intranet island” within a
broader global system that walls off its 1.4 billion citizens, while providing comprehensive modern digital
capabilities under the exclusive control of the CCP. In
addition to a “Great Firewall,” enforced via both technology and legislation, China employs more subtle
methods of censorship and control—for example, the
CCP uses the internet to gain valuable information
about grievances, weaponizing this knowledge into
actionable intelligence.16 Despite a lot of attention on
the potential dystopian uses of these technologies, the
15. Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight,
Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York:
Public Affairs, 2016), 223.
16. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How
Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences
Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no.
2 (May 2013): 1–18.
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CCP also harnesses their power to learn more about
the effectiveness of party leaders at the provincial and
local levels. If successful, China’s model may incentivize other countries to adopt similar approaches as they
transition to digital technologies that offer greater
potential to exercise domestic political control.17
Digital Innovation and Governance
How the region collectively adapts to digital technologies depends on how successful China is in exerting influence through such programs as OBOR and
marketing digital technologies at markedly reduced
prices. China is not settling for today’s technologies.
Sophisticated data mining, machine learning, and
artificial intelligence are imminent, accelerated by significant and targeted investments in innovation. Its
leadership has set a national goal to acquire, via both
licit and illicit means, technologies to advance future
economic and military capabilities.18
Despite the creation of Cyber Command, the
United States remains bureaucratically dispersed in
its efforts to invest in and regulate the digital domain.
17. Seva Gunitsky, “Corrupting the Cyber-Commons:
Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability,” Perspectives
on Politics 13, no. 1 (March 2015): 42–54, https://doi.org/10.1017
/S1537592714003120.
18. Elsa B. Kania, and John K. Costello, Quantum Hegemony?
China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2018),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/quantum-hegemony.
For
reference to China’s illicit means of technology acquisition, see
Jon R. Lindsay and Tai Ming Cheung, “From Exploitation to
Innovation: Acquisition, Absorption, and Application,” in China
and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital
Domain, ed. Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S.
Reveron (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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Technological innovation regularly outstrips existing
legislation or regulations. While American innovation
communities and the broader economy benefit from a
robust entrepreneurial culture, access to venture and
early-stage capital, and minimal barriers to entry for
start-up firms, the United States does not have a single
“Department of Digital.” It is cumbersome to coordinate all stakeholders, let alone develop a coherent
strategy with unity of effort. At a time when American
legislators are considering breaking up digital titans
such as Apple, Google, Facebook, and Amazon, it
may be worthwhile first to consider how best US “big
tech” may effectively counter state-sponsored Chinese
firms, such as Huawei.
Just as the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution introduced sweeping technological, economic,
and social change, today’s Digital Revolution has
exploded over the last 30 years, making it the largest
and fastest human adaptation in history. In the last
decade alone, digital users have gone from just over
one billion to more than four billion.
Currently, India is the second largest online market,
immediately behind China. Despite there being an
anticipated 636 million users by 2021, the Indian internet penetration rate remains relatively low, with more
urban than rural users, and more male than female
users. Usage is largely via mobile devices, and social
media is particularly popular, with Facebook the most
popular social networking site in the country. According to a 2017 report, India’s online education market is
poised to grow dramatically from about $250 million
to almost $2 billion by 2021, with massive interest in
reskilling, online certifications, and test preparation,
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in addition to both primary and secondary supplementary education.19
This unprecedented sweep of change in people’s lives, coupled with the accelerating pace of
technological development, makes predictions
exceedingly difficult; however, lifelong learners are
increasingly recognizing the importance of adaptation
in an ever-changing digital landscape. Critical thinking skills and the ability to adjust to shifting norms
and challenges remains vital, regardless of nationality
or geography.
Influence Operations
A major concern is the expanding use of digital
information technologies for influence operations.
Efforts to sway populations, both foreign and domestic, are nothing new, but emerging digital technologies
have changed the game. With novel digital technologies, influence operations are increasingly easy,
inexpensive, difficult to detect, and hard to counter.
These operations include the weaponization of social
media and the use of “deepfake” mimicries that leverage existing footage. Many new technologies in rapid
development and dissemination will continue to
expand the possibilities for influence operations.
The rise of low-cost propaganda championed by
Russia is gaining attention from actors in the Indo-Pacific, notably China and North Korea, although both
lag behind Russia in sophistication.20 Russia created a
robust collection of both overt and covert capabilities
19. KPMG in India and Google, Online Education in India:
2021 (India: KPMG / Google, 2017), 11.
20. Lora Saalman, “Little Grey Men: China and the Ukraine
Crisis,” Survival 58, no. 6 (2016): 135–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/003
96338.2016.1257201.
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to run secretive efforts by the “troll factory” known as
the Internet Research Agency. Alongside publications
from attributable media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, the Internet Research Agency propagates content
to unsuspecting online sympathizers. China, which
has long run its own fake personas in the form of internet commenters of the “50-Cent Army,” has kept that
capability largely inwardly-focused.21 Appearing to
lag behind Russia in establishing a persistent US audience for digital influence operations, China is beginning to build standing social media audiences for
English-language propaganda. While some countries
embrace censorship, America’s First Amendment protections make it difficult to combat trolling-and-propaganda operations once a real person in the United
States begins propagating the content.
The diffusion of digital technologies with dual-use
applications poses challenges to threat and risk assessments. Confronted with a more adversarial China,
those seeking to protect themselves face the challenge
of a digital world that lacks clear natural barriers.
Adversaries can weaponize information and directly
influence individuals thousands of miles away or control the content and flow of information within their
own state. Centralized control and a lack of political
accountability afford authoritarian regimes substantial advantages in this emerging digital landscape.22
The much-heralded twentieth-century strategy of containment has little application in the digital domain. The United States must decide how far
it is willing to respond in kind or focus instead on
21. Rongbin Han, “Manufacturing Consent in Cyberspace:
China’s ‘Fifty-Cent Army’,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44,
no. 2 (2015): 105–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261504400205.
22. Segal, Hacked World Order.
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patching vulnerabilities and fortifying critical institutions. While recent events trend against the persistence of an open, free internet, the internet already
possesses some clearly delineated borders as growing
numbers of nonconformist actors enter the digital field
and exert control. Continued investments in science,
technology, engineering, and math education; basic
and applied research; both public and private research
and development; critical thinking skills; and retraining are critical to allowing Americans to navigate a
rapidly evolving digital landscape.
The USG should make advancing the digital economies of the Indo-Pacific a key part of its foreign and
international economic policy. Engaging constructively and collaboratively with governments’ policy
choices in the region will be particularly important.
There are concerning trends around forced data localization, content regulation, censorship, market access
barriers, and economic protectionism targeting the US
digital sector. As the world moves into a phase when
the concepts of national and regional networks or
a balkanized internet could do real harm to a global
internet, the USG should push back on those trends.23
A thriving open and secure digital ecosystem in the
Indo-Pacific is key to long-term US interests.

23. Segal, Hacked World Order, 233.
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PANEL 4: FORMS OF CONFLICT AND
COMPETITION
Panelists
• Dr. Joe Felter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for South and Southeast Asia
• Mr. August Cole, Futurist and author of
Ghost Fleet
• Dr. Tanvi Madan, Brookings Institution, Director of India Project
• Ms. Shehzi Khan, Indo-Pacific Command,
Senior Policy Advisor
Moderator: Dr. Jennifer Staats, US Institute of Peace,
Director of East and Southeast Asia Programs
Guiding Questions
• What characteristics of the regional security
environment are likely to persist?
• What implications does the changing character
of war have for the United States in the Indo-Pacific region?
• In the presence of a shifting distribution of
power, how can states in the region manage
relations to avoid armed conflict?
This session focused on the persistent characteristics of the security environment, the implications
for the changing nature of war in the region, and the
importance of regional relations amidst a shifting distribution of power.
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Characteristics of the Regional Security
Environment
Looking to the future of an increasingly competitive global economic and security landscape, the world
is watching the United States and China make sense of
one another. Those interested in better understanding
the Indo-Pacific region can learn from three historic
flashpoints in this part of the world: North Korea,
China-Taiwan cross-strait stability, and India-Pakistan relations. Informed by these experiences and
then some, American policymakers are scrambling to
identify a coherent, long-term vision and to determine
how to manage a rising (or reemerging) China. Is it
a version of containment akin to a twentieth-century
approach or does the United States seek China’s support of existing international values and norms?
In a competition of values, a series of challenges
emerged. From a defense perspective, America’s alliances and partnerships appear very strong as a result
of sustained effort placed on military-to-military
engagement. Stepping back from a security-specific
lens, regional alliances do not appear as robust, particularly when the United States signals it is potentially
stepping back from previously established diplomatic
and economic engagement. Is the world moving more
toward multilateralism or further away from it?
The United States must recognize emerging challenges to democracy worldwide. Many are positing
a false dichotomy by which Indo-Pacific states must
choose between democracy or economic security—
or perhaps democracy or security writ large. Threats
already on America’s radar, such as nuclear proliferation and global terrorism, continue to deserve attention. But it is essential the United States recognize
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other major transnational threats, particularly when
they are central to the contemporary Indo-Pacific experience. Consider, for example, the challenge of climate
change as the top security issue for many Southeast
Asian states, particularly island-based communities.
They seek to understand precisely how American
partners will support their concerns of food insecurity
and fishing rights in the face of climate change. Many
are concerned that climate change has grown unnecessarily politicized and worry that America is interested
in serving only as a security partner, not an economic
or diplomatic one.
Despite sensational headlines of tectonic geopolitical shifts afoot or even a coming Cold War between
the United States and China, there remains more continuity than change in the international security environment. Strong states still compete for power and
influence, and weak states still compete for survival.
Post-Cold War, the United States focused on the Global
War on Terror, but China did not face a significant
threat from transnational terrorist networks. Rather,
throughout this time, Chinese leadership concentrated
on its domestic economic and infrastructure development. Looking forward, the US National Security
Strategy recognizes great power competition is alive
and well in a dynamic Indo-Pacific, even as the precise challenges and decisions afoot remain uncertain.
To that end, the United States must continue to invest
in both civilian and military American resourcefulness
to understand and respond better to future challenges.
Changing Nature of Warfare
Today there is a diminishing marginal difference
among the Great Powers. In the past, only superpowers
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possessed the most advanced military technology, but
this is no longer the case. Commercial technology has
eclipsed government technology, which has diminished the comparative advantage of Great Powers.
Power projection used to be measured in major equipment, but now, cybertools enable any actor with an
internet connection to engage offensively. The world
today stands witness to new domains of warfare,
including cyber and space. Accordingly, the United
States must maintain competitiveness in all these
areas, traditional and nontraditional.
In addition to investing in offensive cybercapabilities and artificial intelligence, the United States must
enable commanders on the ground with more options
and the ability to make decisions more rapidly. The
fog of war is now about having too much information,
rather than not enough. Instead of command-and-control postures with all decisions made centrally, being
effective calls for maintaining mission command by
empowering men and women trained to do their jobs
at all levels. Dealing with overwhelming amounts of
information requires military leaders to be critical
thinkers and to delegate effectively. This capability is
especially true when they work across a massive geographic region, stretching across thousands of miles
and multiple time zones.
The United States is not yet comfortable with
gray-zone competition—nonmilitary means of realizing objectives such as election manipulation, information warfare, and economic coercion—but must
swiftly increase its understanding and management
of efforts below the level of war. China and Russia
do this very well, but the United States has not yet
responded in kind.
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Management of state relations in the Indo-Pacific is
critical for avoiding full-scale conflict. To do this, the
United States must strengthen its existing alliances and
partnerships across the region. In the security realm,
the USG has done well. But security cannot lead in all
relationships. Rather, the United States must strive to
lead diplomatically and economically. It must likewise
consider human security issues as imperative to international relationships, lest resource and water shortages threaten wellbeing and destabilize populations.
Getting Creative
Very different from traditional investment in
weapons development or military exercises, there
is also a growing trend in creative means of futures
planning. The demand signal for alternative methodologies with which to consider the future of warfare
is increasing because conventional approaches are not
up to the task of envisioning the future of combat in
the face of rapid technological change. Consequently,
fiction can become a tool for “thinking the unthinkable” with regards to the future of war.
One way to get ahead of this challenge is to use
storytelling as a method to envision the future more
expansively. The number of actors and influencers in
the planning and operations process is growing more
complex and varied. Many are familiar with human
intelligence and signals intelligence, but one panelist
suggested visionary thinkers and planners have the
potential to challenge assumptions about the future of
warfare and conflict radically via fiction intelligence.
This panelist explored the possibilities for inventive policymakers who empower planners to think
more out-of-the-box and to reveal unconventional
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approaches and solutions. Problems subject to such
analysis could include the need to move goods from
east to west, the evolving security situation in the
Arctic, or the potential of new technologies.
Exploring the “Indo” Side of Indo-Pacific
China-India competition has increased in intensity
since 2008. China is behaving more assertively and is
less willing to hide capabilities and intentions. Despite
multiple bilateral border disputes, no shots have been
fired yet. Beijing is more actively trying to shape politics in the region, irritating India’s quest for its own
leadership. Likewise, a growing economic relationship
between India and China has resulted in an almost $54
billion trade deficit for India, resulting in Indian concern about economic dependence on—and potential
vulnerability to—Chinese influence.24
Another aspect of the India-China relationship is
the regional balance of power. China seems content
with a bipolar or multipolar world while seeking a
unipolar Asia, deeply troubling India. A unipolar Asia
with Chinese leadership challenges the rules-based
order. Considerable cooperation between India and
China has largely evaporated, partly due to these concerns. Many questions persist about India’s role on the
global stage, and India harbors concerns that China
seeks to block its rise within international institutions,
demonstrating not only their widening economic and
military gap but also the lack of trust between them.
Meanwhile, concerns about China have been the
24. “What Is the Trade Balance for China to India? (1995–
2017),” Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed June 10,
2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/line/hs92/show/chn/ind
/all/1995.2017/.
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single most important driver of US-India cooperation for two decades with the United States offering
an essential counterbalance to a reemerging China.
Finally, to America’s chagrin, India also views a closer
relationship with Russia as a potential solution to its
China problem.
Management of State Relations across the
Indo-Pacific
The aim of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy should
be competing effectively, maintaining security, and
helping other countries build capabilities to protect
themselves in support of a rules-based international
order. Consequently, states need not be forced to
choose between opposing powers. Rather, the United
States must actively construct a sustainable relationship with China. Countries are afraid of having to
choose, so the United States must grow comfortable
with countries not going “all in” with it and its allies.
Leading in the Indo-Pacific is also possible without leading from the front. The United States can work
alongside or in support of its partners and allies. To
do so, it must be willing to have a constellation of different arrangements, be they bilateral, trilateral, or
otherwise. As challenging as it may be for the United
States not to impose its preferences, American decisionmakers benefit from listening to and cultivating
locally-owned ideas. Finally, the United States must
remain invested in ASEAN as an extremely important
regional institution committed to a shared vision and
values for the region.
Behind closed doors, many countries recognize the
qualitative value of being an ally of the United States,
but they cannot publicly express such intentions due
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to their relationships with China. Moving forward, the
United States can benefit from continuing to demonstrate its sizable economic, diplomatic, and security
value, while also reassuring states that a binary choice
is not required.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout the three days of Senior Conference
55, recommendations emerged from formal presentations as well as question-and-answer exchanges
involving all the participants. The following are the
five main takeaways:
1. The United States cannot go it alone. Strong
international alliances and effective partnerships are essential, and the United States must
not take these for granted. Over time, the USG
has cultivated longstanding international relationships, which Washington must maintain.
Support for—and active, reliable engagement
in—the rules-based international order is essential for American interests in the Indo-Pacific
and throughout the world. At present, the
United States benefits from goodwill and trust
earned over decades of collaboration during
peace and war. China does not enjoy these
same advantages, which the United States must
work to preserve as China seeks to reshape the
region’s dynamics in its favor.
2. Walk the walk with respect to being free
and open. America must live up to its values
and be the country the world expects it to be.
Accordingly, the US Constitution and Bill of
Rights must serve as its guiding lights. The
United States must take care not to assume
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freedom is necessarily American or Western,
but rather, freedom abides by the shared values
of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Universal
rights include freedom from coercion by other
countries, freedom of values and belief systems, unfettered access to seas and airways,
open investment environments, transparent
agreements between countries, protection
of intellectual property rights, and fair and
reciprocal trade.
3. Continue to pursue joint and multi-domain
approaches. A key strength of America’s military is the ability to conduct joint operations
better than any other military in the world.
But developing effectiveness in the emerging
multi-domain environment is now mission
critical. Bringing to bear a full suite of military capabilities—land, air, maritime, special
operations, cyber, and space—in conjunction
with diplomatic and economic efforts requires
both interagency and international coordination. This work includes moving from concept
to reality by certifying as a land joint task force
headquarters, integrating cyber and space,
more effectively collaborating between military
and civilian organizations, investing in security
force assistance brigades, and actively participating in exercises and other multilateral efforts
to advance collective defense.
4. The United States must engage in the global
economy as a reliable investment and trading
partner. In doing so, American leaders must
plan for 2050, not 2020. China’s use of economic
statecraft in the forms of loans and investment
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is attractive to neighboring countries, whereas
American-led opportunities are sparse, and the
United States is stepping away from multilateral trade agreements. Efforts by the OPIC to
attract private capital and develop the region
economically are noteworthy. But both public
and private-sector leaders must continue to
build capacity for financial investment and
sustainable economic engagement in support
of long-term US foreign policy goals beyond
near-term media cycles or quarterly reports.
Rather than force countries to choose between
the United States and China, it is essential the
United States secures its interests by both competing and seeking mutually beneficial solutions throughout a global marketplace.
5. Invest accordingly. If the United States is serious about developing and working toward a
peaceful long-term vision for the Indo-Pacific,
it must plan, budget, and act accordingly. This
requires not only investing in future combat
capabilities but also in diplomatic, economic,
and educational priorities domestically and
internationally. The Fiscal Year 2020 Budget
should reflect these priorities, as should forthcoming federal programs and budgets.
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